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COMMENT
THE EQUAL PROTECTION
AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES:
TWO MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING
"INTEGRATIONISM" FOR HANDICAPPED
APPLICANTS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Over a decade ago, Professor tenBroek, a noted constitutional law
authority, argued that the United States has been influenced by a
policy of "integrationism"-the policy of encouraging and enabling
handicapped persons to fully participate in the community.1 How-
ever, this nation has yet to see full participation of qualified physically
and mentally handicapped persons in the work force. 2  Until re-
cently, the judiciary has avoided even facing the merits of a handicap
employment discrimination case under a constitutional challenge. 3 Al-
though the federal government and a substantial majority of the states
have enacted legislation to prohibit unjustified employment discrimi-
nation of the handicapped population,4  there are indications that it
has been of limited effectiveness. 5
1. tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 841, 843 (1966).
2. An estimated fourteen million physically handicapped individuals face employment dis-
crimination in the United States. I. KOVARSKY, DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 150 (1976).
Approximately five million mentally retarded persons could work if given proper training and
rehabilitation. 118 CONG. REC. 3320 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
3. In 1974, one commentator observed that no handicap employment discrimination case
had then been decided on the merits under the fourteenth amendment. Equal Employment and
the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J. Soc. PROB. 457, 470 n. 70 (1974).
4. Congress recently enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1975)
which prohibits discrimination against qualified handicapped individuals in federally assisted
programs. This act also mandates that federal departments and agencies, as well as those stand-
ing in a contractual relationship with the federal government where the contract exceeds
$2,500, implement affirmative action programs in employing and advancing qualified handi-
capped persons. For a general discussion of the Rehabilitation Act see B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 220-26 (1976); Equal Employment and the
Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J. L. Soc. PROB. 457, 466-68 (1974); Note, Lowering the
Barriers for Employment of the Handicapped: Affirmative Action Obligations Imposed on Fed-
eral Contractors, 81 DICK. L. REV. 174 (1976); Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped
Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disa-
bility, 8 Loy. CHi. L. J. 814, 829-35 (1977); Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified
Handicapped Individuals, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 803-08 (1976).
Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation which prohibit various
types of handicap employment discrimination. See ALASKA STAT. §9 18.80.220-.300 (1962); CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 1410-33 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19701 (West Supp. 1977); CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 13168.1-.2; 13220.15 (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-302; 24-34-306;
24-34-801 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Supp. 1976); D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
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Today, however, courts are receptive to constitutional challenges to
unfair employment practices directed against handicapped individu-
als. 6 Thus, the advocate for the handicapped person should employ
constitutional theories, when appropriate, as a means of challenging
unjustified employment discrimination. This Comment will discuss
two constitutional provisions which can be successfully utilized to
challenge unjustified handicap discrimination in public employment.
Initially, the three tiers of equal proctection clause 7  review will be
§§ 11.1-.3 (West 1975); 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1480-84; HAW. REV. STAT. § 1378-2 (Supp.
1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. cls. 23 § 3365 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); ch. 38 §§ 13-2; 65-21 to 30; ch.
48 § 853 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-1 to -13 (Burns Supp. 1977); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 601 A.1-7; 601D.2 (West 1975); 1976 Iowa Legis. Serv. 851; KAN. STAT. §§
39-1103; 39-1105 (1973) §§ 44-1001 to -1014 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 207.130-.240
(Baldwin 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4561-4613 (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,
§§ 18-19 (Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law Co-Op Supp. 1976);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.1101-.1208 (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. 9§ 43.15; 363.01-14
(West Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-
301 to -330 (Supp. 1975); NB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-131; 48-1101 to -1125 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 284.012; 613.310-430 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1-:14 (Supp. 1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1; 10:5-5 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-33-1 to -13 (1953); N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW 9 47a (McKinney 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. 9 95-28.1; 128-15.3 (Supp. 1977); § 168.6 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4112.01-.02 (Page Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. 9 659.400-.990 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, §§ 951-63 (Purdon Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS 9 28-5-1 to -39 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-4131 & -4132 (Supp. 1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e (Vernon 1976);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 9§ 497-98 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1976); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.180-.230 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp. 1976); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 16.765 (West Supp. 1977) §§ 111.31-.325 (West Supp. 1974). For further discussion of
state handicap employment discrimination statutes, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra at
226-30; Note, Potluck Protection for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to Arnend Title VII
to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 814, 835-43 (1977).
5. One commentator has argued that state civil rights commissions cannot be expected to
strictly enforce such laws because these commissions have been lax in the enforcement of stat-
utes prohibiting unjustified employment discrimination against other classes of persons. Equal
Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J. L. SOC. PROB. 457, 460 (1974). It has
also been contended that "lack of teeth" in some state laws prevented satisfactory outcome for
the handicapped employee who wins his/her case. Brody, Equal Opportunity Job Laws for the
Disabled Have Little Effect, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1975, at 14, col. 1.
Similar criticism has been made concerning federal enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1975). See Bayh, Forward to the Symposium Issue on Employment
Rights of the Handicapped, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 943 (1978).
6. Several courts have accepted fourteenth amendment procedural due process and ir-
rebuttable presumption theories raised by plaintiffs challenging public employment discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977)(irrebuttable presumption);
Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (irrebuttable presumption); Dren-
non v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (irrebuttable presumption);
Bevan v. New York State Retirement Sys., 44 App. Div. 2d 163, 355 N.Y.S. 2d 185 (App. Div.
1974) (procedural due process). But see, e.g., Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D.
Mich. 1976) (privacy, procedural due process, substantive due process, & irrebuttable presump-
tion).
7. The fourteenth amendment equal protection clause provides that "...No state shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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examined. Secondly, two due process clause 8 theories, procedural
due process and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, will be
analyzed. Finally, this Comment will argue that these constitutional
provisions are a viable means of eliminating unjustified handicap dis-
crimination in public employment.
The aim of integrationism is the elimination of discrimination
directed against individuals with disabilities. Although, the term "dis-
crimination" generally encompasses any act of distinguishing like en-
tities from one another, 9 the integrationist seeks to abolish unjus-
tified discrimination against qualified handicapped job applicants. The
decision not to hire such an individual is unjustified when the de-
cisionmaker has insufficient evidence to support his/her decision or
when the evidence more strongly supports a contrary choice. In con-
fronting this problem employment discrimination laws by implication
have defined unjustified job discrimination.'" Under such laws, un-
justified handicap discrimination occurs when an employer categori-
cally discriminates against a handicapped person who possesses the
occupational requirements necessary for performing the job, because
of a disability unrelated to the effective performance of necessamy job
functions.'' It is this type of employer behavior which the inte-
grationist seeks to eliminate.
8. There are two due process clauses in the U.S. Constitution. The fifth amendment states
"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment, applicable to the states, provides " [N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 238 (1965) defines "discriminate"
as "to distinguish by discerning or exposing differences; esp.: to distinguish (one like object)
from another."
10. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(1) (1962); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-306(a) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West
Supp. 1978); 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1483-84; HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(1) (1978); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48 § 853(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 2 2 -9 -1-3 (q) (Burns Supp. 1977);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.6(1)(a) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. § 44.1002(i) (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 207.150 (Baldwin 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (Supp. 1977); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 49B § 19(a)(1) (Supp. 1977); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 37.202 (Supp. 1977); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subdv. 1(2) (West Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (Supp. 1977);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 64-306(1)(a) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT: § 48.1108(1) (1943); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 613.350.1 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(1) (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:-4.1 (\Vest 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (1953); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (5)
(McKinney Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.02(L) (Page Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955
(Purdon Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4131 (Supp. 1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 4419e, § 3(l) (Vernon 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE § 40.1-
28.7 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1) (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp.
1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)() (West 1974).
11. Id.
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The term "handicap" must also be defined in order to determine
the scope of protection necessary to implement the goals of the inte-
grationist. Part of the problem in dealing with this area results from
the notably broad spectrum of definitions of the word "handicap."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a broad definition of handicap
when it was faced with the issue of whether asthma contituted a
handicap under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. 12  This act did
not contain a definition of handicap. In the case of Chicago, Mil-
waukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. v. Department of Industry,
Labor & Human Relations, 3  the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined
handicap as "a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually dif-
ficult; esp[ecially]: a physical disability that limits the capacity to
work."' 4  The Court summarily concluded that because asthma
makes achievement unusually difficult, it was a handicap under the
act. 15 On this basis "handicap" includes such conditions as diabetes
and hypertension, as well as past histories of illnesses, such as
cancer. 16  Conceivably, conditions such as high blood pressure, stut-
tering, and temporary mental illness could be considered handicaps
under this broad definition because they are disadvantages that make
achievement unusually difficult.17
12. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.37 (1974). For a comprehensive discussion of the Wisconsin
Fair Employment Act, see Comment, Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act: Coverage, Procedures,
Substance, Remedies, 1975 Wisc. L. REV. 696.
13. 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
14. 62 Wis. 2d at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446 citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1027 (1961). See also State v. Turner, 3 Ohio App. 2d 5, 7-8, 209 N.E.2d 475, 477
(1965) (adopting this definition with respect to mental injuries).
15. 62 Wis. 2d at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446.
16. The trend in state employment discrimination statutes has been to broadly define
"physical handicap" to include persons suffering from such conditions as diabetes, asthma,
epilepsy, and hypertension. The statutory trend, in addition, has included those who have a
history of disability or illness who are not presently suffering from such an impairment. B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5 at 227.
Relying on the Chicago, Milwaukee St. Paul, Pacific R.R. Co. definition of handicap, lower
Wisconsin courts have broadened the scope of that state's Fair Employment Act. See, e.g.,
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Indust., Labor & Human Relations, 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1811 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (alcoholism); Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Department
of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1809 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976)
(diabetes); Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 13
Empl. Prac. Dec. 6883 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (leukemia); Journal Co. v. Department of Indus.,
Labor, & Human Relations, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1655 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (deviated
septum); J.C. Penney Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 12 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1109 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (rheumatoid arthritis).
17. Complaints have been filed under state employment discrimination statutes alleging dis-
crimination on the basis of each of these conditions. Brody, Equal Opoortunity Job Laws for the
Disabled Have Little Effect, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1975 at 14, col. 1.
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At the other extreme is the narrow, traditional definition. This ap-
proach was taken by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Providence
Journal Co. v. Mason,18 a case which interpreted The Rhode Island
Fair Employment Practice Act definition of physical handicap. Under
this act "physical handicap" included disabilities, infirmities, and
malformations and was not limited to specific impairments.' 9 The
Rhode Island Court concluded that the legislature did not intend to
protect persons with "any physical disability, no matter how slight,"
rather the handicap had to "be a serious injury or impairment of
more than a temporary nature." 20  Applying this definition the Court
concluded that the condition of whiplash was a temporary impair-
ment, and not a physical handicap. 21 Thus, under the Rhode Island
Court definition, impairments such as blindness, paraplegia, and
deafness would be considered handicaps because each meets the
criteria of seriousness and permanence.22
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The constitutional provisions which have been relied upon to chal-
lenge handicap employment discrimination include the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and the equal protec-
18. 359 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1976).
19. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H) (Supp. 1976) provided that:
"Physical handicap" means any physical disability, [infirmity,] malformation or dis-
figurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness, including, epi-
lepsy, and which shall include, but not be limited to any degree of paralysis, ampu-
tation, lack physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or
hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a
seeing eye dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device.
20. 359 A.2d at 686.
21. Id.
22. This Comment will adopt the traditional narrow definition because it is a better constitu-
tional law approach. In order for a class of individuals to be effectively protected under the
equal protection clause it must either be a "discrete and insular" group or possess a common
permanent characteristic. See notes 35-38; 103-106 and accompanying text infra. The broad
definition does not meet either requirement. Its perimeters are unclear; hence, it does not
describe a discrete and insular group. This definition does not meet the permanent characteris-
tic requirement, either. However, the narrow definition fits both requirements. Only severely
impaired or injured persons-a discrete and insular minority-with permanent impairments
are handicapped persons under the traditional definition.
Additionally, courts generally will be more receptive to a traditional approach. Leon Green,
an American legal realist, has observed that courts are hesitant to extend protection to a new
interest if such an extension appears to be unduly burdensome, expensive, or vain. Green, The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1035 (1928). Given the extent of
handicap employment discrimination in the United States, one would expect that many courts
would be skeptical of expanding constitutional protection to handicapped persons. But see R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977).
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tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment
applies only to "state action" while the fifth amendment applies only
to "federal action." 23  Hence, neither the equal protection clause nor
the due process clause reach private employment discrimination.
Therefore, only public employment discrimination can be chal-
lenged. 24
Equal Protection
1. Strict Scrutiny
In guaranteeing citizens equal protection of the laws, the four-
teenth amendment prohibits the state from engaging in unjustified
23. These principles have recently been reaffirmed. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974) the Supreme Court held that the challenged practices of a privately owned
utility which were authorized and approved by a state commission were not state action. Thus,
the Jackson Court refused to apply the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), a private club's discriminatory practices were
challenged. The Supreme Court held that state action was not present and refused to apply the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.
24. Moreover, although the prohibition of slavery found in the thirteenth amendment has
no state action requirement the Supreme Court has relied on legislative intent to limit this
provision to the prohibition of racial. discrimination. For instance, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court, after examining the framers' intent stated that the 1866
Civil Rights Act (enacted under the authority of the thirteenth amendment) applies only to
racial discrimination. For further discussion of Jones, see Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of
Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred 11. Mayer Company, 22
RUTGERS L. REV. 537 (1968); Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at
Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969); Note, Open Housing: Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 553
(1969); Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination
Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019 (1969); Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary
Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294 (1969); Comment, Civil Rights: Housing Discrimination-Re-
vival of Civil Rights Act of 1866, 53 MINN. L. REV. 641 (1969); 22 ARK. L. REV. 773 (1969); 35
BROOKLYN L. REV. 275 (1969); 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 448 (1969): 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 277
(1968); 29 LA. L. REV. 158 (1968); 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 152 (1969); 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 225
(1968); 21 VAND. L. REV. 271 (1969); 8 WASHBURN L. J. 268 (1969).
The Supreme Court in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) held
that the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibits private racial employment discrimination against whites.
Again, the Court turned to legislative intent to determine the scope of the statute. The Court
found that Congress intended to prohibit racial discrimination against whites and non-whites
alike. It cited language which emphasized racial discrimination. Id. at 288-95.
Lower courts, when faced with non-racial discrimination challenges based on a thirteenth
amendment theory, have also examined framers' intent. Such courts have concluded that the
1866 Civil Rights Act and thirteenth amendment apply only to racial discrimination. E.g.,
Rackin v. Univ. of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1008-09 (E.D. Pa. 1974); League of Academic
Women v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636, 638-40 (N.D. Cal. 1972). But see, e.g.,
Parmer v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043, 1046-47 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd on
other grounds, 503 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1974); see Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to
Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 CEO. L. J. 1501, 1512-19 (1973) (arguing
that the thirteenth amendment can be liberally construed to proscribe private employment dis-
crimination of handicapped persons).
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discrimination. 25 Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has
utilized two tiers of review to analyze claims brought on equal protec-
tion grounds: strict scrutiny and minimal scrutiny.26 The Burger
Court has introduced a third tier of examination, intermediate
scrutiny. 27
Strict scrutiny is invoked whenever state action interferes with the
exercise of a fundmental interest 2 8 or makes a classification on the
basis of a suspect criterion.2 9  Strict scrutiny operates to create a pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality. Classifications have been invalidated
unless the state can show a furtherance of a "compelling state inter-
est" in a narrowly tailored manner. 30 Additionally, the state must
show that the classification completely reaches all those within the
class and no others in order to carry its burden of proving constitu-
tionality. 3'
Strict scrutiny has not been applied to handicap public employment
discrimination challenges unless the complainant can show either that
he/she is a member of a suspect class or that the government's dis-
crimination infringes upon a fundamental interest. To satisfy the
"suspect class" requirement, two basic tests must be met.32  Tie first
test is based on an often cited footnote of United States v. Carolene
Products C0.33 It requires that a class must be a "discrete and insu-
lar minority" to gain suspect status. 34  This requirement is met if a
25. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
26. See generally C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 538-540 (3d ed. 1977);
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. (1972).
27. See generally Gunther, supra note 26; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review
Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62
CEO. L. J. 1071 (1974); Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois, 25 DEPAUL L.
REV. 385, 388 (1976); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975); Yackle, Thoughts on Rod-
riguez: Mr. Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9
U. RICH. L. REV. 181 (1975).
28. E.g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (right to assem-
ble); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (right to procreate).
29. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (nationality).
30. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
31. See generally Turkington, supra note 27 at 388; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 343-46 (1949).
32. Although the Court has not expressly stated that both tests must be met to gain suspect
status, it strongly implied this conslusion in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
33. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
34. This test is based on the following exerpt:
[Pirejudice against discrete, and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
1978] 1175
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class of individuals can be characterized as a readily ascertainable
group which is distinct from the remainder of society. 35
The second test, set forth in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 36  defines a suspect class as one
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process.37
These two tests recently have been used to characterize the status
of handicapped persons as a suspect class. 38 In this context, the
Rodriguez test has been viewed as three independent tests: a suspect
class is one that has been saddled with disabilities or historically
treated unequally or relegated to political powerlessness. 39  Under
tends seriously to curtail the operation of the political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152-53 n. 4.
35. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (per
curiam). The Surpeme Court used the "discrete and insular minority" test in Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) to bestow suspect status on aliens because they constitute a
distinct, isolated minority. The Court denied this status to the elderly in Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia because they are not a clearly defined group.
36. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
37. Id. at 28. The Rodriguez Court applied this test to find that the poor were not members
of a suspect class. Id. The Court then determined that education was not a fundamental interest
because it is not implicitly or explicitly protected under the Constitution. Id. at 35. Because of
the absence of a suspect class and a fundamental interest, the Court invoked the minimal
scrutiny rationality test to examine the challenged system of public education financing. It con-
cluded that reliance on local property taxes was rational even though it resulted in great dis-
parities between rich and poor district per pupil expenditures. Id. at 56-59. For further discus-
sion of Rodriguez, see generally Harrison, What Now After San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez?: Electoral Inequality and the Public School Finance Systems in Califor-
nia and Texas, 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 191 (1974); Boos, The Potential Inspact of Rodriguez on Other
School Reform Litigation, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 566 (1974); Note, San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez: A Retreat from Equal Protection, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS
L. REV. 195 (1974); Comment, Disparity in Financing Public Education: Is There an Alternative
to Rodriguez?, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 88 (1973); 18 How. L. J. 435 (1974); 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 155
(1973).
In Murgia the Supreme Court applied both Rodriguez and Carolene Products to hold that the
elderly were not members of a suspect class. 427 U.S. at 313-14. The Court also affirmed the
notion that employment was not a fundamental interest. Id. The majority held that a state
statute requiring police officers to retire at age fifty was rational. Id. at 314-17. For a discussion
of the rationality determination made by the Court in this case, see note 90 infra, See generally
Comment, The Burger Court's "Newest" Equal Protection: Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine
Rejected-Two Tier Review Reinstated, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 140.
38. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handi-
capped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under The Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 855 (1975). [Hereinafter cited as Burgdorf & Burgdorf.]
39. Id. at 906.
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the first Rodriguez criterion handicapped persons have been charac-
terized as a class "saddled with disabilities" by definition and as such,
necessarily are members of a suspect class. 40 However, this argu-
ment overlooks the fact that many handicapped individuals possess
only one disability and are not literally saddled with disabilities.4 1
Therefore, only multiple handicapped persons should be considered a
suspect class under this criterion.
It has also been argued that handicapped persons meet the second
Rodriguez criterion because they have a history of being subject to
unequal treatment. 42 Legislation has existed which subjected epilep-
tics, the mentally ill, and mentally retarded persons to sterilization;
prohibited mentally retarded, epileptic, and mentally ill persons from
marrying; and denied driver's licenses to individuals with epilepsy. 43
Additionally, the contract law requirement of legal capacity has pre-
vented mentally handicapped persons from entering into enforceable
contracts. 44 Handicapped persons have also been subjected to un-
equal social treatment, including social ostracism. As a class, they
have suffered discrimination in employment, transportation, and edu-
cation and have been subjected to inhumane institutionalization prac-
tices. 45
40. Id.
41. Other suspect minorities, such as aliens and blacks, are saddled with linguistic and cul-
tural disabilities.
42. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 38 at 907-08.
43. In the late 1950's, twenty-eight states had sterilization statutes, seventeen of which
specifically included individuals with epilepsy, mental illness, and mental retardation. Id. at
861. See O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L. J. 20 (1956). Most states prohibit
marriages in which one of the parties is mentally incoinpetent. At one time, seventeen states
had prohibitions against marriage by persons with epilepsy. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 38
at 861. Nearly all states restrict the driving rights of persons with epilepsy. Id. at 863 n. 51.
44. Id. at 861-62. This rule of law also limits mentally incompetent persons' rights in other
legal matters. For instance, one must be of sound mind and memory to execute a will. W.
PAGE, 1 THE LAW OF WILLS 230 (2d ed. 1926). A settlor of a trust must also have legal
capacity. G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 21 (3d ed. 1952).
45. Historically, handicapped persons who were not imprisoned were driven from the cities
and punished upon returning. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 38 at 884-85.
Large numbers of handicapped persons face discrimination. An estimated nineteen million
handicapped persons face employment discrimination. See note 2 supra. Approximately
13,370,000 persons have such a handicap as to experience difficulties in utilizing mass transit
systems as presently designed. Achtenberg, Law and the Physically Handicapped: An Update
with Constitutional Implications, 8 Sw. U. L. REV. 847, 866 n.57 (1976). Over 2.2 million
handicapped children receive schooling indadequate for their educational needs. Another 1.75
million receive no educational services at all. Krass, The Right to Public Education for Hand-
icapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1016, 1016. See gener-
ally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 44 at 864-83.
Institutionalized handicapped persons have been subjected to prisonlike atmospheres. Segre-
gation of the sexes, as well as segregation from friends, relatives, and "normal society," was
prevalent in past institutionalization practices. Burgdorf & Burgdorf at 889-90.
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However, these inequities are insufficient to bestow the status of
"suspect" upon handicapped persons in general. Historic unequal
legal treatment and inhumane institutionalization generally were in-
curred by only four subclasses of handicapped individuals.: the men-
tally retarded, epileptics, mentally ill persons, and multiple handicap
individuals. 46  Only these groups can meet the second Rodriguez
test, not the entire class of handicapped persons, although they have
been subjected to social ostrascism and discrimination. The Supreme
Court has held that other disadvantaged groups which have been
subjected to ostracism and discrimination, such as illegitimates and
the elderly, have not experienced such a degree of unequal legal
treatment to be classified as "suspect." For instance, in Mathews v.
Lucas, 47  the Court held that illegitimacy is not a suspect classifica-
tion. 48 The majority, recognizing that illegitimates have been sub-
jected to discrimination, found that it has never reached the level of
the historic legal and political discrimination waged against other
groups considered "suspect." 49  Using this same analysis in Murgia,
the Court found that the aged have not "experienced a history of
purposeful unequal treatment" which suspect groups have faced, al-
though the elderly have been subjected to a history of discrimina-
tion. 50
Finally, it has been argued that the third Rodriguez criterion was
satisfied because handicapped persons can be characterized as politi-
cally powerless. 5 ' Forty-six state constitutions and related state
legislation deny mentally handicapped persons the right to vote. 52
Other state statutes prohibit mentally handicapped persons from
holding office. 53  Additionally, transportation difficulties and architec-
tural barriers at polling places make it difficult for persons with seri-
46. Id. at 889. However, other handicapped persons have faced historic unequal treatment.
For instance, 8 U.S.C. 1182(7) (1970) provides that aliens "who are certified by the examining
surgeon as having a physical defect, disease, or disability. . . of such nature that it may affect
the ability of the alien to earn a living, unless the alien affirmatively establishes that he will not
have to earn a living... " shall be excluded from admission to the United States and shall be
ineligible to receive visas. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 38 at 862. This statute, how-
ever, does not discriminate against handicapped individuals per se. Rather, it makes a distinc-
tion between those aliens who are capable of subsistence in the U.S. and those who are not.
Hence, this statute lends more support to the contention that poor persons have been subjected
to unequal legal treatment.
47. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
48. Id. at 504-06.
49. Id. at 506.
50. 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1975).
51. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 38 at 906.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 906-07.
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ous mobility problems to vote. 54  However, despite these facts the
third Rodriguez criterion is met only by some members of the class of
all handicapped persons: mentally handicapped persons and mentally
competent individuals with mobility impairments. Moreover, despite
transportation barriers, the availability of absentee voting permits
those who cannot be at their respective polling places on election day
to cast ballots. Thus, it is clear that mobility impaired persons are not
politically powerless as a class.
In summary, it is arguable that handicapped persons, as a whole,
under the traditional narrow definition of "handicap" meet the
Carolene Products "discrete and insular minority" test of suspect-
ness. 55 But, as a whole, handicapped persons cannot be deemed
members of a suspect class because collectively they do not satisfy
any of the three independent Rodriguez criteria. From previous dis-
cussion it is clear that epileptics, mentally retarded persons and mul-
tiple handicapped persons meet at least one of the three Rodriguez
tests as well as the Carolene Products tests. 56 Accordingly, these
three subclasses may be properly classified as suspect and therefore
entitled to strict scrutiny by the judiciary.
Although different rationales have been used, case law is generally
consistent with the interpretation of the Rodriguez and Carolene Prod-
ucts tests to hold that handicapped persons do not constitute a sus-
pect class. 57  For example, the New York Court of Appeals in Matter
of Levy 58 held that handicapped children do not constitute a suspect
class. This court did not rely on Rodriguez or Carolene Products
rationale. Instead it cited, without discussion, cases holding that il-
legitimacy was not a suspect classification and decisions holding that
race, national origin, and alienage were suspect criteria. 59
Moreover, the status of multiple handicapped persons as compris-
ing a suspect class was expressly denied in Department of Mental
54. Id.
55. Under the narrow definition of handicap, handicapped persons are a discrete and insular
minority. They are a readily ascertainable group because they possess severe, permanent dis-
abilities-characteristics not shared by the remainder of the population. For a discussion of the
narrow definition of handicap, see text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
56. These three subclasses fulfill the Carolene Products "'discrete and insular minority" re-
quirement because objective data can be used to ascertain the members of these groups.
57. In fact some courts have expressly stated that handicapped persons are not members of
a suspect class. For instance, a federal district court in dictum concluded that blind persons are
not members of a suspect class. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 992 n.8 (E.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd on other grounds, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
58. 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S. 2d 13 (1976) appeal dismissed sub. nom.
Levy v. City of New York, 429 U.S. 805 (1976).
59. Id. at 658, 345 N.E.2d at 558, 382 N.Y.S. 2d at 15.
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Hygiene v. Dolan.60  In this case an equal protection challenge was
waged against a state statute which provided maintenance to blind
and deaf children as state expense at certain state educational institu-
tions. The counter plaintiff, a child who was deaf as well as retarded,
was denied free maintenance. The Dolan court found Matter of Levy
controlling.61 The Dolan counter plaintiff sought to distinguish Levy
on the ground that handicapped children at state institutions are a
"more discrete class." 62  The Dolan court rejected this analysis be-
cause no evidence was adduced to establish that institutionalized
handicapped children were member of a suspect class. 63
The Levy holding, which concerned the entire class of handicapped
persons, should not have been controlling in Dolan, which concerned
the subclass of multiple handicapped persons. The Dolan court
should have found the existence of a suspect class based on the Rod-
riguez and Carolene Products tests. Multiple handicapped persons
are "saddled with disablities" and have been "historically treated un-
equally." Furthermore, multiple handicapped persons constitute a
"discrete and insular minority" because each member of the subclass
possesses at least two severe, permanent impairments. 64
Courts have recently, however, recognized a distinction between
handicapped persons as a group and special subcategories by ex-
pressly bestowing suspect status upon certain types of handicapped
individuals. In 1974 the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re
G.H.65  held that a young girl with severe multiple handicaps pos-
sessed "just the sort of 'immutable characteristic determined solely by
the accident of birth' to which the 'inherently suspect' classification
would be applied." 66  The North Dakota Court purported to base
this decision on Frontiero v. Richardson,67  a Supreme Court plural-
ity opinion holding that sex is a suspect classification. 68  The North
60. 89 Misc. 2d 1003, 392 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1977).
61. Id. at 1007, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
62. Id. 392 N.Y.S.2d at 984-85.
63. The Dolan Court also stated that further subdivision of handicapped children weakens
the thrust of the defendant's position. Id. 392 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
64. See text accompanying notes 18-22.
65. 218 N.W. 2d 441 (N.D. 1974).
66. Id.at 447. The North Dakota Court then concluded that the state was obligated under
the equal protection clause to provide the handicapped child an education at the state's ex-
pense. Id.at 447-48.
67. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
68. Id.at 688. The Frontiero plurality stated that gender was "an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth" and cited evidence that women, as a class, have
been subjected to invidious social and political discrimination. The plurality concluded that the
imposition of hardships by the legislature upon members of a particular gender because of their
1180 [Vol. 27:1169
1978] INTEGRATIONISM 1181
Dakota Court applied the "immutable characteristic" language found
in that decision to severe multiple handicaps. The Frontiero suspect
classification test has since been impliedly rejected by a majority of
the Supreme Court. 69 However, the G.H. holding is consistent with
Rodriguez because multiple handicapped persons are "saddled with
disablities" and have been subjected to a history of unequal treat-
ment.
Several U.S. District Courts have likewise confronted equal protec-
tion challenges made by mentally retarded children. 70 In 1973, the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York in New
York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v.. Rockefeller, 7 1
held without citation or reasoning, that mental retardation is not a
suspect classification. 72  In 1975, the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Fialkowski v. Shapp, 73 carefully
examined Rodriguez and G.H. to determine the appropriate level of
scrutiny to analyze a statute which absolutely denied public education
to mentally retarded children. The Fialkowski court utilized an in-
termediate level of scrutiny 74 but in dicta stated that mental retarda-
tion was a suspect classification. 75 The Fialkowski court, in reaching
gender "would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility.' [citation omitted] " Id. at 686. Thus, based on
these factors, the Frontiero Court concluded that gender was a suspect classification.
69. In a number of Supreme Court decisions decided after Frontiero, a standard less than
strict scrutiny was applied to gender based classifications. E.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975) (upholding Navy procedures which treat officers differently on the basis of sex in
promotion and discharge determinations); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding a
statute which provided mandatory medical coverage for employees within the state, excluding
coverage for disability that accompanies normal pregnancy and child birth); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding a state law which provided widows with a property tax exemption
but excluded widowers).
Recently, the Supreme Court has established a new test for scrutinizing gender based classifi-
cations. To withstand an equal protection challenge such a classification must be "substantially
related" to the achievement of "important governmental objectives." Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Court has not applied the strict
scrutiny compelling state interest test to such classifications since the Frontiero decision. Thus,
the Court has impliedly rejected the Frontiero suspect classification holding.
70. In Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46
(N.D. Ohio 1976) a class action was brought challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's system of
education andlor training for mentally retarded school age children, on equal protection and due
process clause grounds. The district court used the rational basis test to scrutinize plaintiffs
claim. Thus, this case impliedly held that mental retardation was not a suspect classification. Id.
at 52.
71. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
72. Id. at 762.
73. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
74. For a discussion of intermediate scrutiny, see text accompanying notes 93-118 infra.
75. 405 F. Supp. at 959.
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this conclusion, stated that the Rodriguez criteria for suspectness was
satisfied because thirty-two states have subjected mentally handi-
capped individuals to unequal treatment by enacting statutes providing
for sterilization of retarded persons and additionally cited the fact that
retarded children have been historically denied admittance to public
schools. 76  However, the Fialkowski court, because it was confionted
with the complete denial of educational opportunity, did not require
a determination of whether mental retardation was a suspect classifi-
cation. 77
The Fialkowski analysis is clearly more well-reasoned than the
Rockefeller approach. Mentally retarded persons not only met two of
the Rodriguez tests as being historically treated unequally and being
politically powerless. 78  They also met the Carolene Products discrete
and insular requirement because they are a clearly defineable group
of persons. Thus, the Fialkowski dicta is consistent with the Supreme
Court's indicia of suspectness.
Although strict scrutiny is also triggered when a classification in-
terferes with the exercise of a fundamental interest, 79 the interest in
employment is neither recognized as fundamental in the Constitution
nor in case law.80 Hence, only three subclasses of handicapped per-
sons: epileptics, mentally retarded persons, and individuals with mul-
tiple handicaps, are per se entitled to strict scrutiny review of
employment discrimination challenges since they qualify as suspect
classes. 8' Such handicapped persons have the greatest chance of
76. Id. at 959 n.9 citing O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L. J. 20 (1956).
77. The court then held that tinder intermediate scrutiny, plaintiffs had an actionable claim,
and thus denied defendants' motion to dismiss. 405 F. Supp. at 959.
78. See text accompanying notes 42-44 & 52-53 supra.
79. The United States Supreme Court has determined that a number of interests are fun-
damental.- E.g., Police Dep't. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (first
amendment rights); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel interstate);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(right to be afforded procedural fairness). The Court has expressly denied other interests this
status. E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing).
80. The Rodriguez Court promulgated the test to determine whether an interest is funda-
mental: a fundamental right is one "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 411
U.S. 1, 33-34. Case law firmly establishes that employment, an interest not guaranteed under
the Constitution, is not a fundamental interest. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam).
81. See text accompanying notes 40-56 supra. However, handicapped persons challenging
pre-employment inquiries of public employers may be afforded strict scrutiny review because of
the potentially fundamental interest at stake. A recent Supreme Court decision indicates that
personal medical information may be encompassed in the constitutional right of privacy, a fun-
damental interest. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977) (dictum). If such data is pro-
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prevailing in public employment discrimination suits because strict
scrutiny presures that the challenged action in unconstitutional. Ac-
cordingly, persons with these handicaps are entitled to protection
from all unjustified public employment discrimination. It is clear,
however, that discrimination can be justified when the particular job
requires skills not possessed by the handicapped individual. The
mentally retarded individual's lack of the job requirement of average
intelligence is a sufficiently compelling reason to refuse employ-
ment. 8
2
2. Minimal Scrutiny
Under the Warren Court's two tier system, minimal scrutiny was
applied to classifications which did not affect fundamental interests
and which were not based on suspect criteria. A classification has
been constitutionally upheld under this tier if it is "rationally related"
to a "legitimate state interest."83  Moreover, rationality of the clas-
tected from unwarranted exposure, then public employers would have to assert a "compelling"
reason for requesting a job applicant to furnish such information. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942). Under this standard, an employer could request data which is necessary to
determine whether the job applicant has the necessary occupational requirements for the job in
question. A federal district court in Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
applied such a standard to the challenge, on constitutional grounds, of a job applicant for the
position of bus driver. The plaintiff applicant contended that the defendant city's inquiries con-
cerning the applicant's prior history of mental illness was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
The employer's interest in making the inquiry was the determination as to whether the appli-
cant possessed the occupational requirement of emotional stability. The district court concluded
that the employer's interest in obtaining the information was sufficient to override the job
applicant's privacy interest. Id.at 1074. For a discussion of the other constitutional issues re-
solved in Spencer, see text accompanying notes 122-28 & note 136 infra.
82. Although the Supreme Court generally declares classifications unconstitutional when it
invokes strict scrutiny, it has held that some classifications based on suspect criterion are the
only means of effectuating a compelling state interest. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
83. Fourteenth amendment tests which determine the reasonableness of legislation have
undergone significant changes in application over the past century. From the 18 70's to the
1930's, the "rule of reason" was a means of critically scrutinizing economic legislation challenged
on due process grounds. See C. PHICKETT, supra note 26 at 518-30. Operationally, this test
acted as a substantive means of review-i.e., a judicial instrument for passing judgment on the
substantive policies of legislation. Most legislation examined tinder the test in this era was found
to be "unreasonable" and therefore declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring minimum wage statute unconstitutional); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (declaring ten hour work day statute unconstitutional). But see,
e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding ten hour workday for women).
In the 1930's the rule of reason was transformed into a less demanding means of examining
legislation. The Court began to defer to the legislature. Reasonableness of legislation was pre-
sumed. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum
wage statute), rev'g, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding price regulation of milk). See C. PRICKETT, supra at 530-34.
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sification is presumed even if it is patently over-inclusive, affecting
more persons than necessary to accomplish the purpose of the clas-
sification, or under-inclusive, not affecting all persons necessary to
accomplish the objective of the classification. 84 Since it is apparent
that the rational relationship test is applied by the courts in a superfi-
cial manner, minimal scrutiny, in essence, means virtually no scrutiny
at all.
Minimal scrutiny has been invoked to examine employment dis-
crimination challenges brought by handicapped persons when strict
scrutiny was found inapplicable because of the absence of suspect-
ness. For instance, in 1976 a federal district court applied the min-
imal scrutiny rational relationship test to examine a public em-
ployment discrimination challenge brought by a plaintiff with a past
history of mental illness.85 In this case, the defendant city denied
The rule of reason has since been verbalized as the "rational relationship" test. Until recently,
the Court has continued to presume that legislation analyzed under this test is reasonable and
therefore constitutional. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
(upholding statute forbidding opticians to fit or replace eye glass lenses without a prescription of
an ophthalmologist or optometrist). But see, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (declar-
ing unconstitutional statute which exempted American Express Co. money orders from licensing
and state regulation).
Under the "new" equal protection of the Burger Court, the rational relationship test has
undergone a further alternation. For a discussion of this change, see text accompanying notes
107-109 infra. See also Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness In Constitutional Adjudication:
Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and The Establishment of A Viable Theory of
the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 153 (1975); Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L. J. 123 (1972).
84. For instance, in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per
curiam) the Supreme Court applied the rationality test to a state statute which required man-
datory retirement of state police officers at age fifty. The Court concluded that this law was
rationally related to the interest of assuring physical preparedness of police officers and held
that the law was constitutional. The Court presumed the rationality of the law despite its over
and under inclusiveness. The statute was over inclusive because some state police officers older
than age fifty are physically capable of performing their job. It was under inclusive because not
all state police officers younger than age fifty are physically fit. For further examples of the
Court's presumption of rationality, see County Bd. of Arlington County, Va. v. Richards, 98 S.
Ct. 24 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535 (1972).
85. Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976). The Spencer court im-
pliedly held that mentally ill persons are not members of a suspect class. This same implicit
conclusion was reached in Montoroula v. Parry, 54 App. Div. 2d 327, 388 N.Y.S. 2d 916 (1976).
In Montoroula, a lower New York state court was faced with an equal protection challenge to a
medicaid classification which denied mentally disturbed persons benefits while providing such
benefits to physically handicapped persons. The Montoroula court implied that mentally dis-
turbed persons were not members of a suspect class by applying minimal scrutiny to the clas-
sification in question. Id. at 332, 388 N.Y.S. 2d at 919.
The implicit holding reached by the Spencer and Montoroula courts can be justified on the
basis of the Carolene Products discrete and insular minority test. Mentally ill persons are not
such a minority because the temporary nature of some such disorders, as well as the various
1184
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plaintiff employment as a bus driver because of her past illness. The
court concluded that the city denial was justified in that it reasonably
promoted the safety of passengers and other users of public streets.
8 6
However, the court did not determine whether the plaintiff's past
illness would manifest itself in an unsafe manner. In other words, it
did not decide whether she possessed the occupational requirement
of emotional stability at the time she applied for the job. Additionally,
the city's policy of denying employment for the position of bus driver
to persons with past histories of mental illness was both under-inclu-
sive (not -affecting mentally ill persons whose condition has not been
diagnosed) and over-inclusive (affecting persons without mental illness
having a prior history of such a condition). However, because mini-
mal scrutiny was utilized, the state successfully justified its actions by
asserting the state interest in public safety.
3. Intermediate Scrutiny
The Burger Court has introduced a third tier of equal protection
examination, intermediate scrutiny.8 7 Definite rules defining when
this form of review is appropriate have yet to be established by the
Supreme Court. A federal district court has found that this tier
should be utilized to scrutinize "quasi-suspect classifications" and
"quasi-fundamental interests." 88  This appears to be the approach
taken by the Supreme Court when it has seemingly employed middle
tier review in cases involving the right to receive welfare benefits and
the rights of minors to procreate.8 9 Additionally, the Court has
degrees of severity of such conditions, makes it nearly impossible to clearly define this group of
persons.
86. 408 F. Supp. at 1073.
87. See note 27 supra.
88. Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
89. The Burger Court has seemingly applied intermediate scrutiny to a statute impinging on
the right to receive welfare benefits. In United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973), the Court applied the "rational relationship" test to strike down a statute which
prohibited members of households composed of unrelated persons from receiving food stamp
benefits. Although the Court applied the traditional minimal scrutiny test, it engaged in closer
scrutiny than usually applied tinder this test. The Court found that Congressional intent to
discourage fraud was not necessarily promoted under this statute. Under minimal scrutiny, the
Court does not engage in such a probing analysis. For a discussion of Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam), a case in which the rational relation-
ship test was applied in the traditional superficial manner, see note 84 supra.
The Supreme Court has expressly indicated that the privacy interests of minors are given
middle tier review. The Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976), set forth the test for scrutinizing state restrictions inhibiting the procreation rights of
minors. Such restrictions are valid only if they serve "significant state interest [s]." Id. at 75. In
Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court noted that the Danforth test
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utilized the intermediate scrutiny test to classifications based on gen-
der,90 and illegitimacy. 91 The Supreme Court has applied this test to
void classifications which are not "substantially related" to the
achievement of "important governmental objectives," do not further
"significant state objectives," or which do not bear "some rational re-
lationship" to a legitimate state purpose. 92 Hence, this test requires
that a governmental classification actually be established as a ration-
ally tailored means to more than a nominal state interest. Accord-
ingly, there is no presumption of rationality or unconstitutionality of
the classification tinder this tier.
Although the Supreme Court has not given any indication of what
constitutes a "quasi-fundamental interest, ' 93  language used in il-
legitimacy discrimination cases seems to set forth the criterion of
"quasi-suspectness." A reasonable determination of whether hand-
icapped persons constitute a quasi-suspect class can, therefore, be
made. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 94 a 1972 opinion,
appears to set forth characteristics of a quasi-suspect class. In Weber,
a state workman's compensation law was challenged because it denied
dependent illegitimate children benefits which were provided to de-
was less rigorous than the strict scrutiny compelling state interest test although it was not a
toothless form of review. Id. at 693 n.15.
90. See note 69 supra.
91. Although the Burger Court has concluded that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in
a "realm of less than strictest scrutiny," it has maintained the position that such classifications
should be afforded more than a toothless scrutiny. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767
(1977). See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-10 (1976); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
92. Three distinct tests for intermediate scrutiny have emerged. Currently, the Supreme
Court demands that gender based classifications be "substantially related" to the achievement of
"important governmental objectives." Califino v. Goldfiarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976). When the legislature interferes with the minors' right to procreate, the
Court determines whether "significant state objectives" are furthered. Carey v. Population
Services lnt'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976). Cf Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (strict scrutiny used to analyze inter-
ference with an adult's right to procreate). The third intermediate scrutiny test is the "strict
rationality" test. This requires that a classification bear some "rational relationship" to a legiti-
mate state purpose. United States Dep't. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). On its face, this test is identical to the
minimal scrutiny rational relationship test. Compare Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)
(intermediate scrutiny rationality) with San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (minimal scrutiny rationality). However, the intermediate scrutiny test, strict rationality,
is a more vigorous examination of a legislative classification. Rationality is not presumed under
strict rationality. For a discussion of the minimal scrutiny rationality test, see note 84 supra. For
further discussion of strict rationality, see text accompanying notes 101-103 infra.
93. This Comment will not attempt to determine whether employment constitutes such an
interest.
94. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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pendent legitimates for the death of one's natural father. This deci-
sion strongly implied that illegitimates, as a class, should be given
special judicial protection because they have been unjustly and illogi-
cally condemned for possessing a specific permanent characteristic. 95
The Court found that such condemnation was "contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relation-
ship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."96 The majority
then declared the statute unconstitutional because it bore no rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
The Weber reasoning, which has been expressly affirmed by sub-
sequent cases, 97 recognized two characteristics possessed by quasi-
suspect classes. First, all the members of the class possess a common
permanent trait, such as being born out of wedlock or being a specific
gender. Second, because of this trait members of this class, as a
whole, have been subjected to unjust and illogical discrimination.
Handicapped persons possess both of these characteristics. All
members of this group possess handicaps, which are permanent
characteristics under the traditional definition. 98 Because of these
impairments, handicapped persons have faced unjustified discrimina-
tion in transportation, employment, and education,99 as well as
having been historically ostracized by society. 100 Thus, under the
Weber analysis handicapped persons are a quasi-suspect class which
should, therefore, be afforded protection under the intermediate
scrutiny test.
Currently, there are two alternative intermediate scrutiny articula-
tions used to examine quasi-suspect classifications. The rationality test
requires that a classification bear some rational relationship to the
purpose it is designed to promote. 101 Under intermediate scrutiny,
95. Id. at 175-76.
96. Id. at 175. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality of the Court
found that women, as a class, possessed the characteristics identified in Weber. See note 68
supra. After citing evidence that women had been the victims of invidious discrimination, the
plurality held that gender was a suspect classification. Id. at 688. This holding has been im-
pliedly rejected in subsequent Supreme Court d!ecisions. See note 69 supra. However, the
Frontiero analogy of women to illegitimates, which implies that these two classes should be
afforded a similar means of equal protection review, has been tacitly affirmed by later decisions
which apply intermediate scrutiny to gender and illegitimacy based classifications. Compare
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (gender) with Trible v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)
(illegitimacy).
97. E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
505 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974).
98. See note 22 supra.
99. See note 45 supra.
100. Id.
101. A problem arises in discussing this test in relation to intermediate scrutiny. The ration-
ality test is essentially the same verbalization as the minimal scrutiny rationality test. Yet, there
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unlike minimal scrutiny, 10 2  there is no presumption of rationality.
Hence, courts determine whether a legislative classification is actually
established as a rationally tailored means to more than a nominal state
interest.' 03 The second intermediate scrutiny test is the "important
governmental objectives" test. This provides that a classification be
"substantially related" to the achievement of "important governmental
objectives" to withstand constitutional attack. 10 4  This test appears to
be a more rigorous means of scrutiny than the intermediate scrutiny
rationality test. 105 Thus far, the Supreme Court has applied this ap-
proach to gender based classifications only. 10 6 Since the rationality
test is the form of intermediate scrutiny review afforded newly-recog-
nized quasi-suspect classes, 10 7  it should be used to analyze public
employment discrimination challenges of handicapped persons.
At least one court has held that handicapped persons are members
of a quasi-suspect class and are thereby entitled to intermediate
scrutiny review of equal protection claims.' 08 In Frederick L. v.
Thomas,' 0 9  a federal district court was confronted with a civil rights
is an obvious difference in the manner in which the test is applied. Under minimal scrutiny,
rationality is presumed. Thus, patently over-inclusive and under-inclusive classifications are up-
held in a minimal scrutiny context. For a discussion of the minimal scrutiny rationality test, see
text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
102. Id.
103. The intermediate scrutiny rationality test has been labelled by one federal district court
as "strict rationality." Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
104. See note 92 supra.
105. Administrative convenience alone can never justify a classification under the important
governmental objectives approach. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). However, in some
circumstances administrative convenience is a sufficient state objective under the strict rational-
ity test. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976).
106. The Court first applied this test in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In that case it
examined a state statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males tinder twenty-one
years of age but permitted the sale to females age eighteen and older. Applying this test, the
Court declared the statute unconstitutional.
107. The first time the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny to a gender-based clas-
sification, the rationality test was applied. Sqe Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
108. A number of courts have applied intermediate scrutiny in cases in which disabled chil-
dren were denied equal educational opportunity. Although none of these courts expressly stated
so, they strongly implied that education is a quasi-fundamental interest thereby mandating
greater than minimal scrutiny. However, these cases can also be construed as affording hand-
icapped children quasi-suspect status. E.g., Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.Va.
1977); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E. D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam) aff'd 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); In re Jessup, 85 Misc. 2d 575, 379 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Fam. Ct. 1975).
See generally Krass, supra note 45; Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education:
The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 519 (1974); Comment, The Handicapped Child
Has a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REV. 637 (1976).
109. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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suit which alleged that children with specific learning disabilities 110
were discriminated against by failure of the defendant board of educa-
tion to provide instruction specially suited to such children's hand-
icaps. The district court noted that the case involved education, a
quasi-fundamental interest. Additionally, it stated that the plaintiff
class, although not suspect, "exhibited the essential characteristics of
suspect classes-minority status and powerlessness.""' Therefore,
the Frederick L. court held that the intermediate scrutiny rationality
test was the appropriate means of scrutinizing plaintiffs' claims."
2
Due Process
1. Procedural Due Process
The second constitutional provision which can be used to challenge
unjustified public employment discrimination of handicapped persons
is the due process clause. Procedural due process requires that an
individual deprived of a property or liberty interest be afforded a
meaningful evidentiary hearing to determine whether this deprivation
can be justified. 113  The property interest, rather than the liberty
aspect of this provision, is most relevant in handicap employment dis-
crimination.
The Supreme Court has generally followed a three-step approach in
resolving procedural due process claims. First, the Court determines
whether the plaintiff possesses a property interest. Next, it decides
whether governmental action has impaired that interest. Finally, if
impairment is found, the Court determines what procedures the gov-
ernment must follow to satisfy due process under the cir-
cumstances." 4  Each of these steps is crucial to analyzing the rights
of handicapped persons who were victims of unjustified employment
discrimination.
In Board of Regents v. Roth," 5  the Supreme Court set forth the
criteria for determining whether one has a property interest. The
110. Plaintiff children with specific learning disabilities according to the complaint have "'dis-
order[s] in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in
using language, spoken or written .... Such disorders include such conditions as perceptual
handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia." Id. at
833-34 n. 1.
111. Id. at 836.
112. Id. The Court then denied defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id.
113. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed.
1975) 895-97.
114. See generally Bishop v. Woods, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
115. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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Roth Court held that property interests, are created and defined by
"existing rules or understandings that stem from [a] . . . source such
as state law-rules that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlements to those benefits."" 6 Accordingly, if the state
in which the discrimination took place has promulgated a public pol-
icy of forbidding unjustified public employment discrimination of
handicapped persons, 1 7 handicapped complainants meet this criter-
ion. The second step requires the aggrieved handicapped person to
establish that his/her employment interest was impaired. A showing
that the handicapped individual was denied an employment oppor-
tunity although he/she possessed all the necessary occupational re-
quirements fulfills this criterion for it is clear evidence of a property
interest impairment."l 8 If the first two steps are satisfied, then the
aggrieved party must be afforded a hearing on the constitutionality of
his/her deprivation. In order for this constitutional right to be mean-
ingful, the hearing examiner must be impartial.119 Clearly, pro-
cedural due process is not a viable theory if the employer appoints a
biased hearing officer. Should that party make an unjustified decision,
the handicapped person on appeal would have to demonstrate that
this fct-finding determination was wholly unsupported by "compe-
116. Id. at 577. For a comprehensive discussion of Roth, see Kallen, The Roth Decision: Does
the Nontenured Teacher Have a Constitutional Right to a Hearing Before Nonrenewal?, 61 ILL.
B. J. 464 (1973); Comment, Due Process and the Non-Tenured Professor: A Comment on Roth
and Perry, 8 GONZ. L. REV. 99 (1972); Note, Public Employee's Right to a Pre-termination
Hearing Under the Due Process Clause, 48 IND. L. J. 127 (1972); 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 624
(1973); 73 COLUM. L. REV. 882 (1973); 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 684 (1973); 38 Mo. L. REV. 279
(1973); 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 357 (1972).
117. For instance, the Kansas Act Against Discrimination provides in part that:
It is also declared to be the policy of this state to assure equal opportunities and
encouragement to every citizen regardless of. . . physical handicap . . . in securing
and holding, without discrimination, employment in any field of work or labor for
which he is properly qualified ....
KAN. STAT. § 44-1001 (Supp. 1976). For examples of other state statutes promulgating similar
policies, see note 4 supra.
118. In effect, the complainant must show that he/she has been the victim of unjustified
discrimination. For a general discussion of unjustified discrimination, sue text accompanying
notes 9-11 supra.
Although the applicant seeking the governmental benefit usually has the burden of dem-
onstrating eligibility, state employment discrimination laws may reverse this burden so that
handicapped persons are presumed qualified. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11580 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1977).
119. There is widespread employer prejudice against handicapped persons. See Nathanson,
The Disabled Employee: Separating Myth from Fact, 55 HARV. Bus. REV. 6,6 (No. 3 1977);
Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J. L. Soc. PRon. 457, 458 (1974);
Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled,
61 GEo. L. J. 1501, 1512 (1973).
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tent, substantial, and apparently credible evidence." 120 Because of
this heavy burden of proof placed on a party appealing a fact-finder's
determination, the handicapped person under these circumstances is
likely to have a greater chance of prevailing if he/she had initially
brought the suit on equal protection in addition to due process
grounds.
The second means of invoking procedural due process is by dem-
onstrating the deprivation of a liberty interest. Roth set forth the
criteria to be alleged when a deprivation of liberty is asserted. This
criteria includes a consideration of whether one's standing in the
community was damaged; whether one's good name, reputation, or
honor was at stake; and whether any stigma was attached to an al-
leged deprivation of a governmental benefit. 121 However, because
none of these factors are usually present in a handicap discrimination
challenge, there is nothing inherent in handicap employment dis-
crimination or the laws proscribing such discrimination which neces-
sarily triggers procedural due process on a liberty interest basis. For
instance, in Spencer v. Toussaint,l2 2  the plaintiff, a job applicant
with a past medical history of mental illness, claimed that the city's
rejection of her application for the position of bus driver deprived her
of procedural due process. The court concluded that under the Roth
liberty interest criteria, no deprivation of liberty existed because
there was no evidence that the city's decision imposed on the plaintiff
a stigma or other disability which foreclosed her freedom to take ad-
vantage of other employment opportunities. 123 In support of this
position, the court relied on evidence that the plaintiff subsequently
gained employment with the state.1
2 4
Although the Spencer decision is consistent with the Supreme
Court's procedural due process approach, this decision could have
had a different result under slightly varying facts. First, if the plaintiff
had proven that the city's decision imposed a stigma on her, she
wbuld have been entitled to a hearing. This could have been estab-
lished by empirical data demonstrating that employers are extremely
120. This is the standard which an appealing party must meet to overturn a fact finder's
determination. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 188 n.201 (1972).
121. 408 U.S. at 573.
122. 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976). For a discussion of the Spencer court's equal
protection analysis, see text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
123. Id. at 1072.
124. Id. It next held that the plaintiff's property interests were not as great as those of the
Roth plaintiff, a university professor denied tenure.
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reluctant to hire disabled persons. 1 25 By refusing to hire handi-
capped persons, it is arguable that employer-stereotyped prejudices
are aggravated, thereby stigmatizing handicapped job applicants.
However, this argument can only be made if the city's reasons for
denying plaintiff employment are made public. 1 26  A second fact
variation that could have triggered procedural due process in Spencer
was the existence of an articulated public policy against handicap
employment discrimination by the state. Had Spencer taken place in
a jurisdiction which had adopted a broad policy of prohibiting
employment discrimination of handicapped persons, the plaintiff
would have met the property interest requirement. 127  The plaintiff
would then have to establish that she possessed all the necessary oc-
cupational requirements. Under some state laws this would be suffi-
cient to establish unjustified discrimination.' 28  Otherwise, the plain-
tiff would have to show that she was rejected on the basis of her
former disability. This she could easily do because the city notified
her in writing that she was rejected for medical reasons. Had the
plaintiff established this in such a jurisdiction the court would then be
required to grant her a hearing.
2. The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine
The second potential due process challenge to public employment
discrimination of handicapped persons is the validity of the irrebutta-
ble presumption that handicapped persons are incapable of perform-
ing certain jobs. An irrebuttable presumption is created when a gov-
ernmental body states that an actual fact or set of circumstances is
conclusive evidence of a presumed fact and forbids the introduction of
evidence to refute this presumption. 129  The Supreme Court uses a
125. A study analyzing handicap prejudice indicated that personnel directors prefer to hire
former prison inmates to epileptics. Rickard, Triandis, & Patterson, Indices of Employer Prej-
udice Toward Disabled Applicants, 47 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 52 (1963).
126. The Supreme Court in Bishop v. Woods, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) clarified the Roth criteria,
holding that one is not deprived of liberty interests in employment unless the reasons for denial
of employment are made public. For an extensive discussion of Bishop, see Note, A Constitu-
tional Interest in Public Employment: The Last Hurrah?-Bishop v. Woods, 26 DEPAUL L.
REv. 631 (1977).
127. The Spencer plaintiffs application was rejected by the City of Detroit in 1973, four years
before Michigan guaranteed equal employment opportunity for handicapped persons. See
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.1101-1208 (Supp. 1977). However, the Michigan statutory definition
of handicap does not include temporary mental illness. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 37.1103(b)
(Supp. 1977). Thus, the statute would not have established a property interest for the plaintiff.
128. See note 118 supra.
129. See generally Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny:
From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 CEO. L. J. 1173 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An
Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1975).
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three-step process in irrebuttable presumption cases. First, it deter-
mines whether the doctrine is applicable. Second, if the doctrine
applies, the Court subjects the challenged presumption to rigorous
scrutiny for constitutional defects. Third, if the Court finds that the
presumption is not true in fact, the complainant is granted a hear-
ing. 130
The Supreme Court has not clearly designated what invokes the
application of a strict scrutiny in analyzing irrebuttable presumptions.
It has invoked this level of scrutiny to analyze the validity of conclu-
sive presumptions of presumed out-of-state residency of college stu-
dents who were non-residents at the time of application; 131 the sup-
posed unfitness of an unwed father to be a parent; 132 the presumed
lack of need of food stamps in households which included a member
who was at least eighteen years old and was claimed as a dependent
child by a taxpayer who was not a member of a household eligible to
receive food stamps; 133 and the supposed physical incompetency of
school teachers who were three months pregnant. 134  On the other
hand, the Court has refused to apply irrebuttable presumption
scrutiny to a presumption that a person marrying a wage earner who
died within nine months of marriage was presumed to have entered
into matrimony for the purpose of receiving social security ben-
efits. 135
Several explanations have been offered to explain the basis of the
Court's distinctions. First, it has been asserted that this strict test is
invoked when life, liberty, or property interests are at stake.' 3 6 This
0
130. See generally Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
131. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
132. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
133. Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
134. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
135. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
136. See Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (E.D. Mich. 1976). This explanation
accounts for the application of the doctrine in family relations cases. Language used in these
cases lends support for this explanation. For instance, in Turner v. Department of Employment
Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam), the Court voided a statute which declared pregnant
women ineligible for employment compensation benefits for twelve weeks prior to and six
weeks after childbirth. The Court relied exclusively on Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974) as controlling precedent noting that LaFleur, an irrebuttable presumption case,
concerned "'freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life '" which is pro-
tected under the due process clause. 423 U.S. 44, 46. The Court has since relied on another
irrebuttable presumption case, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), to support the conten-
tion that the privacy of family relations is entitled to procedural due process protection.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 n. 8 (1976) (dictum). This explanation also explains the
use of the stricter test in Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), a food
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explanation requires courts to make the same determinations as are
made under procedural due process claims.137 Additionally, ir-
rebuttable presumption analysis has been used when the presump-
tions involve substantive rules embedded in once prevalent attitudes
which have become outdated.' 3 8  But this explanation sets forth no
objective criteria by which courts can determine whether irrebuttable
presumption scrutiny is appropriate.1'9 Thirdly, the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine has been held to apply only to cases which do
not involve social security benefits. 140 This interpretation is based on
the factual distinction between the Supreme Court case analyzing the
Social Security Act presumption of good faith matrimony and the
other Supreme Court irrebuttable presumption decisions. 14 1
Under the latter two explanations, handicapped persons who have
been the victims of unjustified employment discrimination are virtu-
ally assured irrebuttable presumption review. Handicapped persons
can establish that general attitudes regarding their inability to suc-
cessfully undertake employment are unfounded and, therefore, no
longer command general assent. 142 They should be afforded ir-
rebuttable presumption scrutiny under the third explanation because
employment should be given a higher standard of review than social
security.
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined
that the irrebuttable presumption test was applicable in Gurnankin
v. Costanzo,' 43 a case challenging a school district's policy of refusing
blind job applicants the opportunity to take a teacher's examination.
0
stamps case. For some, food stamps are a necessary means of subsistence, and thus a life inter-
est. However, this theory does not explain why the irrebuttable presumption test should be
used to scrutinize residency requirements.
137. The Spencer court adopted this view and rejected the plaintiff's irrebuttable presump-
tion claim on the same basis that it rejected her procedural due process challenge. 408 F. Supp.
at 1072-73. See text accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
138. See Tribe, Front Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: Learning
Front Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545, 553-54 (1975).
139. This theory implies that the doctrine is merely a disguise for substantive due process.
Several members of the Court have maintained this position. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 455 (1973) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting joined by Burger, C.J. and Douglas, J.). For a discus-
sion of substantive due process, see note 89 supra.
140. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184, 187 n.5 (3d Cir. 1977).
141. Compare Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (social security classification denied
rigid scrutiny) with Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (employment policy
afforded rigid scrutiny).
142. See Nathanson, The Disabled Employee: Separating Myth from Fact, 55 HARV. Bus.
REV. 6 (No. 3 1977); Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the
Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L. J. 1501, 1512 (1973).
143. 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
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The Gurmankin court relied on the Supreme Court case of Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur 144 to demonstrate the applicability of
the doctrine. LaFleur held that mandatory leaves for pregnant
teachers five months before childbirth created an unconstitutional ir-
rebuttable presumption of physical incompetency to teach. The Gur-
mankin court ruled that the plaintiff, a blind job applicant, was in a
position analogous to the pregnant teachers in LaFleur, and likewise
was denied the opportunity to refute the presumption that she was
physically incompetent to teach.1 4 5
Once a court finds that irrebuttable presumption review is appro-
priate, it engages in a form of review similar to that of equal protec-
tion strict scrutiny to determine whether the government's interest in
having the permanent irrebuttable presumption is justified. In hand-
icap employment discrimination cases, the court must decide whether
the presumption that individuals with a certain handicap are not
competent to perform a particular job is correct. 146 Once the court
determines that the state has created an unconstitutional irrebuttable
presumption, then as in procedural due process, it grants the hand-
icapped complainant a hearing. In Gurnankin the court examined the
school district's presumption that blind persons could not be compe-
tent teachers of sighted children. After granting a hearing, the court
ruled that this presumption was unjustified because expert testimony
established that many blind persons can overcome their disability to
144. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
145. 556 F.2d at 187. The Gurmankin court distinguished Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975), a U.S. Supreme Court social security benefits case in which the Court refused to apply
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to a conclusive statutory presumption. The Gurmankin
court held that LaFleur rather than Salfi controlled because Salfi is a government benefits case,
therefore deserving lesser review while LaFleur and Gurmankin concern employment. 556 F.2d
at 187 n.5.
146. That presumption, however, may be changed by operation of law. In some jurisdictions,
employers are required to make "reasonable accommodation" for handicapped persons. See, e.g.,
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(a) (1977); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1.1 (West 1975); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 37.207 (Supp. 1977). MONT. ADMIN. CODE § 64-306(1)(a) (Supp. 1975); ILLINOIS FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES COMMISSION, GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
§ 3.2(D) (1976). The presumption in such jurisdictions is more easily refuted. The advocate for
the handicapped person need only present evidence proving the invalidity of the presumption
that individuals with a certain handicap are incapable of performing a particular job when given
reasonable accommodation by the employer. However, because the meaning of "reasonable ac-
commodation" has not been precisely determined, the perimeters of this implied in law pre-
sumption are unknown. See generally Note, Lowering the Barriers to Employment of the
Handicapped: Affirmative Action Obligations Imposed on Federal Contractors, 81 DICK. L.
REV. 174, 183-84 (1976); Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped Indi-
viduals, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 813-17 (1976).
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become average or better than average teachers, noting that over four
hundred blind persons nationally are teaching. 147
However, when one's handicap is directly related to job perfor-
mance, this analysis has reached an opposite result. For instance, in
Coleman v. Darden 148 a federal district court found that the irrebut-
table presumption that blind persons cannot perform the job of legal
research assistant was justified. The Coleman court concluded that
sufficient visual acuity was an occupational requirement which bore a
direct relationship to the duties of the job. 149  The irrebuttable pre-
sumption test, like strict scrutiny, will sustain employment discrimi-
nation if such discrimination is justified.
CONCLUSION
There are a number of reasons the advocate for a handicapped per-
son should assert constitutional theories to challenge public employ-
ment discrimination. 150 First, state and federal administrative rem-
edies have proven to be unsatisfactory.15 1 Second, attorney's fees are
recoverable. 152  Third, administrative remedies need not be
exhausted to assert a constitutional claim.' 53  Finally, courts have
broad equitable powers to remedy infringements of constitutional
rights. 54
The receptiveness of the judiciary to handicap employment dis-
crimination claims should be enlightening to the integrationist.
Handicapped persons, as a class, can now successfully challenge un-
justified acts by way of intermediate scrutiny, procedural due process,
147. This was the determination of the district court. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp.
982, 986 (E.D. Pa. 1976) aff'd 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
148. 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977).
149. Id. at 6789.
150. One commentator has argued that statutory claims should be joined with constitutional
challenges for tactical reasons. Constitutional theories speak of "suspect classes" and "invidious
discrimination." According to this viewpoint, such language can invoke judge sympathy for the
complainant. Workshop presentation in Chicago, Illinois (April 14, 1978) by Jonathan Stein,
Director, Community Legal Services.
151. See note 5 supra.
152. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. 1977) pro-
vides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [section] ...1983 ...of this title,
[the jurisdictional means of vindicating conistitutional rights] .... the court in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs."
153. Courts have carved an exception to the "exhaustion of administrative remedies" doctrine
for plaintiffs raising constitutional claims. Id. See, e.g., Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v.
Trainer, 68 1ll.2d 540, 548, 370 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1977): Walker v. State Bd. of Elections,
657 111.2d 543, 552, 359 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1976).
154. Stein, note 150 supra. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971).
1196 [Vol. 27:1169
19781 INTEGRATIONISM 1197
and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Three subclasses of hand-
icapped individuals can challenge such discrimination by means of
strict scrutiny. As a result, the public work force may soon be inte-
grated with qualified handicapped persons.
Thomas E. McClure

